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A tabloid worker dies in Florida. Two postal
workers die in Washington, D.C. A homebound
retiree dies in Connecticut. An envelope packed
with a white substance raises alarm when it is
opened for routine screening at a US correction-
al facility. The common link? Spores from
Bacillus anthracis. Fortunately, the white powder
at the correctional facility did not contain anthrax
spores, and moreover, correctional officials rec-
ognized the potential anthrax threat, deposited
the envelope in a secure receptacle, quaran-
tined the area and alerted the authorities. Proper
training and access to appropriate protocols for
handling suspect substances (Table 1) allowed
the correctional officers to maintain calm while
experts were consulted. 
Bioterrorism is an offshoot of biological warfare.
Biological warfare is the use of bacterial or viral
agents as weapons. Waging biological warfare is
a violation of the Geneva Convention of 1925,
which was reaffirmed by the UN General
Assembly in 1966. Despite these affirmations,
bioterrorism has recently occurred. 
Medical events related to exposure to anthrax
have been reviewed in detail in several publica-
tions.1,2 Lane, La Montagne and Fauci, and oth-
ers have reviewed the etiologic agents of biolog-
ical terrorism.3,4 A wealth of bioterrorism
resources are also now available in medical jour-
nals5,6,7,8 and on the web (see Resources).
Because knowledge is the best defense against
terror, this article will review some biological
agents of terror, appropriate medical responses,
and available means of treatment or prevention. 
The seven characteristics of a bioterrorism
agent are listed in Table 2. Of the seven, four
(virulence, infectivity, stability and transmissibili-
ty) can be affected by modifying the genetic
sequence of the bioterrorism pathogen.
Research on these four characteristics is the pri-
mary thrust of most modern biological warfare
research laboratories, and antibiotic resistance
will be a significant concern during future bioter-
rorist events. On the other hand, mutations intro-
duced in the anthrax used in the most recent
outbreak may eventually yield up its identity.6
Lethal agents are also very effective bioterrorism
tools because of the “panic effect” on suscepti-
ble populations (recent events certainly confirm
this observation).7 Potentially lethal agents that
have been placed in category A (high threat)
include smallpox (Variola), bubonic plague
(Yersinia pestis), tularemia (Francisella tularen-
sis) and anthrax (Bacillus anthracis). (Table 3)
These will be reviewed here.
ANTHRAX
Pathogen and Immunopathogenesis
Bacillus anthracis a gram-positive spore-form-
ing bacteria. The bacterium only sporulates
under adverse conditions (lower oxygen avail-
ability or declining pH); thus production of
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Table 1: What to do if you suspect
Anthrax in the mail
G Do not handle the mail piece or package
suspected of contamination.
G Make sure that damaged or suspicious
packages are isolated and the immediate
area cordoned off.
G Ensure that all persons who have touched
the mail piece wash their hands with soap
and water.
G Notify your local law enforcement authori-
ties.
G List all persons who have touched the let-
ter and/or envelope. Include contact informa-
tion and have this information available for
the authorities.
G Place all items worn when in contact with
the suspected mail piece in plastic bags and
have them available for law enforcement
agents.
G As soon as practical, shower with soap
and water.
G Notify the Center for Disease Control
Emergency Response at 770-488-7100
for answers to any questions.
Adapted from the USPS website:
http://www.usps.com/news/2001/press/
pr01_1010tips.htm
Preparing for Bioterrorist Threats 
in Corrections
anthrax spores requires familiarity with
these conditions. Anthrax disease is initiat-
ed by introduction of endospores by inhala-
tion or via cutaneous contact  (usually with
skin that is otherwise compromised). At the
site of entry, macrophages endocytose the
anthrax spores and transport them to
regional (in cutaneous anthrax) and tho-
racic (in inhalation anthrax) lymph nodes.
Within the first few hours of infection,
anthrax bacilli escape from the phagocytic
vesicles of macrophages and replicate
within the cytoplasm of these cells. The
next phase of infection involves release of
the mature bacilli from infected
macrophages, four to six hours after the ini-
tial phagocytosis.11 Proteins secreted by
the mature bacilli combine to form the two
anthrax toxins: lethal toxin (LT) and edema
toxin (ET).12 These toxins attack and
destroy macrophages, causing them to spill
their contents and damage surrounding tis-
sues. 
Anthrax: Clinical course
Of 10 recent cases described in JAMA, all
but one was known to have handled mail
contaminated with spores; the time of
exposure to onset of symptoms (when
known) was four to six days.2 Symptoms at
presentation included fatigue or malaise,
fever or chills with sweats, dyspnea, mini-
mal or nonproductive cough, and nausea or
vomiting. The white blood count was ele-
vated but not markedly so, at 9.8 X
103/mm3 (range 7.5 to 13.3). Increased
neutrophils and band forms were present.
Six of the 10 patients were hypoxic, and all
10 chest X-rays were abnormal. On the X-
rays, pulmonary infiltrates, pleural effu-
sions, or mediastinal widening were noted,
and involvement of the mediastinal nodes
was confirmed with chest CTs. It is notable
that inhalation of anthrax spores was previ-
ously believed to be lethal even at low
doses. In the most recent reports, there
was a 60% survival rate after exposure,
which improved with prompt treatment, and
chemoprophylaxis may have decreased
the number of individuals who became
overtly ill. Given a high enough index of
suspicion and early aggressive treatment
with effective antibiotics, recovery has now
been shown to be possible. Thus, the
threat of anthrax is much diminished in a
vigilant clinical environment.
Anthrax: Treatment and Vaccine
Since anthrax is only contagious by spores,
isolation and quarantine of infected individ-
uals is not thought to be necessary. Prompt
antibiotic treatment with potent anti-gram
positive agents such as ciprofloxacin, clin-
damycin, amoxacillin, clarithomycin,
imipenem, vancomycin, rifampin, or even
choramphenicol is recommended (see
Table 4). All of these agents have been
shown to be active in vitro against the
Ames strain of anthrax associated with
recent exposures. Penicillin (in combina-
tion with another agent), choramphenicol,
vancomycin or rifampin should be consid-
ered when CNS involvement is suspected.
Because of concern about possible antibi-
otic resistance of B. anthracisused in a
bioterrorist attack, doxycycline or
ciprofloxacin was chosen initially for antibi-
otic chemoprophylaxis until the susceptibil-
ities were known. Recommendations
switched to penicillin VK or amoxicillin once
antibiotic susceptibilities were known. The
required duration of prophylaxis is
unknown, but is believed to be at least 90
days post exposure, based on available
information on the persistence of vegeta-
tive spores.13
The BioPort Company makes the existing
anthrax vaccine from a cell-free filtrate of B.
anthracis cultures. The strain used to
prepare the vaccine is V770-NP1-R,
a toxigenic, nonencapsulated strain.14
Vaccination using the inactivated cell-free
filtrate vaccine requires six injections. As
many as 30% of recipients experience local
reactions, and life-threatening anaphylaxis
has been associated with the existing vac-
cine.15,16,17Currently, the vaccine is neither
recommended nor required, except for mil-
itary personnel. Vaccine may be available
to individuals who wish to be immunized,
but not to children and pregnant women.
Development of a new anthrax immuniza-
tion strategy has become a national priori-
ty. 
PLAGUE
Plague: Pathogen
The very threat of exposure to Yersinia
pestis, the causative agent of plague,
strikes fear in the heart of any individual
who is familiar with world history: Between
one third to one-half the population
(approximately 50 million people) died from
Y. pestisduring the years of Black Death in
Europe. During the epidemic of plague in
London during the late 1600’s, physicians
abandoned the hospitals to the care of
orderlies and fled, aware that exposure to
diseased individuals could lead to trans-
mission of the disease and death.18 While
antibiotics such as tetracycline and strepto-
mycin can now prevent plague after expo-
sure and treat all forms of the disease,
Black Death remains a bioterrorist threat19
that is compounded by the existence of
antibiotic resistant strains20 and widespread
availability of the pathogen due to recurrent
epidemics.21 Airborne dissemination of
drug-resistant plague by terrorists would
have a devastating impact on civilians, hos-
pital staff, and military personnel.
Yersinia pestis, the etiologic agent of
plague, is a gram-negative obligate aerobe
2
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Table 2: Seven criteria determine the potency of a biological weapon
1. Virulence- the damage inflicted by the weapon must be severe, though not neces-
sarily fatal;
2. Infectivity- the size of the dose required to initiate an infection (best if low dose for
economy of distribution) including the method of dosing;
3. Stability- the organism must survive and remain infectious until it reaches the host;
4. The extent of natural immunity (the target population must have low immunity for
the agent to be effective);
5. The availability of vaccines and other protective measures to the user, but not to
the target;
6. The availability and ease of therapy (the organism should not be readily treatable
by common anti-infective agents);
7. Transmissability, which is person to person spread of the disease (in warfare trans-
missability needs to be low to hit the target population and not start a worldwide pan-
demic. In terrorism, that approach may not be necessary.)
Table 3: Potential bioterrorist agents categorized by level of threat 
to public health
CATEGORY A
Bacillus anthracis(anthrax)
Clostridium botulinum 
toxin(botulism)
Yersinia pestis(plague)
Variola major(smallpox)
Francisella tularensis
(tularemia)
Viral hemorrhagic fevers
CATEGORY B
Coxiella burnetti(Q fever)
Brucellaspecies (brucellosis)
Burkholderia mallei(glanders)
Ricin toxin from 
Ricinus Communis
Toxin of Clostridium perfringens
Staphylococcusenterotoxin B
CATEGORY C
Nipah virus
Hantaviruses
Tickborne encephalitis
viruses
Yellow fever 
Multidrug-resistant TB
Adapted from Lane and Fauci3
Being Prepared
Y-2-K awakened us to our potential vulnerability through MIS.  We worked long and hard to
prepare. January 1, 2000 came and went and "the world as we know it" did not end. But we
were ready and we learned some things. One was reinforcement of our emergency operations
procedures, or red books.
September 11 awakened us to the reality of terrorist-caused mass casualty incidents IN THE
U.S.A.! We knew they happened in the Middle East; we knew they happened in Northern
Ireland; we knew they happened in Britain; we knew they happened in Sri Lanka; but this was
in the U.S. of A. We were NOT well prepared. We've had to scramble since then and we con-
tinue to react.
And then along came anthrax. That awakened us to the reality of bioterrorism IN THE U.S.A.!
We thought nobody would dare; but somebody did. And it is much easier and less expensive
to grow bacteria cultures or virus than it is to build a nuclear bomb or many other potential
weapons of terrorism.
Although it seems unlikely that terrorists would directly target corrections, as part of larger
communities we are at risk and would be affected by bioterrorism or other types of mass casu-
alty incidents. We must be sure our emergency operations procedures include plans to deal
with bioterrorism and that we have established lines of communications with both public safe-
ty and public health agencies. As you read about specific potential bioterrorism agents, think
also about your response system and your communication links, especially with public health.
The agent used could be something nobody has discussed but our systems must be ready to
rapidly exchange information and respond. Safety and lives of our staff and our inmates may
depend upon it.
After reading this issue, providers should be familiar with the presentations of and treatments
for the bioterrorism pathogens discussed. Furthermore, since we hope that smallpox will not
be common in corrections we have included an algorithm for the management of VZV, a pox
more common in corrections. In addition, providers should have a sense of the various viral
infections associated with HIV infection including their manifestations and ways to treat and
prevent these infections.
Lester N. Wright, MD
Letter from the Editor
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4belonging to Enterobacteriacieae. The bac-
terium has several chromosomal and plas-
mid-associated factors that are linked with
virulence and survival in mammalian hosts
(such as rats)  as well as the flea vector.
Plague is endemic in certain areas of the
world, causing epidemics when local condi-
tions contribute to rodent infestation of
human living quarters. More than 18,000
cases of plague were reported to WHO
between 1980 and 1994.22 One recent out-
break (Madagascar, 1996) was also marked
by the discovery of two strains of multi-drug
resistant Y. pestis, raising concern about the
efficacy of antibiotics against plague in the
future.21
Plague: Clinical course
Infection follows transmission by flea bite, by
direct contact with infectious body fluids or
by inhalation of airborne aerosolized bacte-
ria. Infection causes an illness that is char-
acterized by severe fever, myalgia, malaise,
shaking chills, prostration, and gastrointesti-
nal symptoms. The three forms of plague
are bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic. 
Bubonic plague is the most common form of
the disease, or 80 to 90% of the cases
reported to the CDC in the United States.
The incubation period of bubonic plague is
two to six days. The most striking physical
manifestations of bubonic plague are
enlarged, necrotic lymph nodes (buboes) of
the groin or armpit closest to the site of infec-
tion. Buboes are caused by Y. pestisinfect-
ed macrophages migrating to the local
lymph nodes. Septicemic plague occurs
when Y. pestisinvades and multiplies in the
blood stream. The case-fatality rate of sep-
ticemic plague is 50% (most of these cases
received treatment). Pneumonic plague is
the most dangerous and fatal form of the dis-
ease, and the form most likely to occur when
used as a terrorist weapon. The incubation
period is one to three days, and patients who
do not receive adequate treatment within 18
hours after the onset of respiratory symp-
toms are unlikely to survive. 
An aerosolized plague weapon could cause
fever, cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis
with signs consistent with severe pneumonia
one to six hours after exposure. Rapid evo-
lution of disease would occur in the two to
four days after symptom onset and would
lead to septic shock with high mortality with-
out early treatment. If 50 kg of Y. pestiswere
released as an aerosol over a city of five mil-
lion, pneumonic plague would occur in as
many as 150,000 persons, and 36,000 could
die.23
Plague: Treatment and Vaccine
Early treatment and prophylaxis with tetracy-
cline (doxycycline) or fluoroquinolones
(Ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin) is effective.
Streptomycin or gentamicin is also effec-
tive.19 Killed bacteria have been used in
plague vaccine since 1896. The only whole
cell (killed) vaccine produced in the U. S.
was discontinued by its manufacturers in
1999. Plans for future production or licens-
ing are unclear. The vaccine was prepared
from formalin-inactivated Y. pestis organ-
isms. Reactions to the vaccine were report-
ed, tended to increase in number and sever-
ity as the number of doses increased, and,
on occasion, were fatal.24 However, the vac-
cine appears to be effective. Only eight
cases of plague were diagnosed among
U.S. personnel in Vietnam who received
plague vaccine (one case per 106 person
years of exposure). In contrast, there were
thousands of cases of plague among citi-
zens in Vietnam during the same period
(333 cases per 106 person years of expo-
sure, 1961-1971). It is not clear whether the
vaccine protects against pneumonic plague,
as there were at least two reported cases of
pneumonic plague in successfully vaccinat-
ed military personnel.25
TULAREMIA
Tularemia: Pathogen
Tularemia is a disease caused by the facul-
tative intracellular bacterium, Francisella
tularensis. Infection is usually associated
with exposure to rabbits, and tick bites
Preparing For
Bioterrorist Threats...
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Pathogen
Inhalationl
Anthrax 
CutaneousI
Anthrax 
PlagueII
TularemiaIII
Small PoxIV
Preferred Treatment
Initial (intravenous):
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg
every 12h OR
Doxycycline 100 mg
every 12 h AND one or
two additional antimi-
crobials 
(oral): Ciprofloxacin
500 mg po BID OR
Doxycycline 100 mg
po BID 
contained casualty 
setting: Streptomycin 
1 g IM twice daily 
Streptomycin 15-20
mg/kg/day IM in divid-
ed doses x 7-14 days
There is no proven treatment for smallpox.
Patients with smallpox can benefit from support-
ive therapy (intravenous fluids, medicine to con-
trol fever or pain, etc.) and antibiotics for any
secondary bacterial infections that occur.
Alternative Treatment
Immunocompromised
individuals: same as
non-immunocompro-
mised adults**
Immunocompromised
individuals: same as
non-immunocompro-
mised adults**
contained casualty set-
ting: Doxycycline, 100
mg IV twice daily or 200
mg IV once daily
Ciprofloxacin, 400 mg
IV twice daily
Chloramphenicol, 25
mg/kg IV 4 times daily**  
Gentamicin 2-5
mg/kg/day in divided
doses x 7-14 days
Comments
IV initially.  Switch to
oral anitmicrobial thera-
py when appropriate:
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg
po BID OR Doxycycline
100 mg po BID
Continue for 60 days
(IV and po combined)
60 Days
For mass casualty 
and postexposure 
prophylaxis, see
www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/
Plague/Consensus.pdf
Clinical relapse occurs
more frequently when
tetracycline or chloram-
phenicol are used
(loading dose 30 mg/kg
orally, then 30
mg/kg/day orally in
divided doses x 14 D)
In people exposed to
smallpox, the vaccine
can lessen the severity
of, or even prevent ill-
ness if given within 4
days after exposure.
Table 4. Treatment of Infections from Pathogens Likely to be used 
in Bioterrorism
I. MMWR 50 (42): 917-919.
II. These guidelines are from a consensus paper. There have not been large published trials of
treating plague in humans. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Plague/Consensus.pdf
III. Mandell GL, Douglas RG, Bennett JE eds.  Principles and Practice of Infectious Diseases.
Churchill Livingston Inc; New York: 1985.
IV. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/DocumentsApp/FactsAbout/facts_about.pdf
*For more guidelines, visit the CDC at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/DocumentsApp/Anthrax/
10312001/han51.asp and http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5043a6.htm
** For guidelines on pregnant women and children, see MMWR 50 (42): 917-919.
Continued on page 5
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appear to be the main means of transmis-
sion to humans.  The peak incidence was in
1939, when about 2,300 cases were report-
ed. An outbreak of tularemia recently
occurred on Martha’s Vineyard.26
Tularemia: Clinical Course
After cutaneous exposure, Tularemia can
presents as slow to heal ulcer at the site of
contact, along with swelling of the regional
lymph nodes. Oral ingestion can cause
pharyngitis, abdominal pain, diarrhea and
vomiting. Inhalation of infectious material
may be followed by pneumonic involvement
or a primary septicemic syndrome. The
pneumonic/septicemic syndrome is associ-
ated with a 30%-60% case-fatality rate if
untreated, and it is very similar to the pre-
sentation of anthrax. 
Tularemia: Treatment and Vaccine
Prompt treatment with streptomycin, gen-
tamicin, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin is rec-
ommended. Prophylactic use of doxycycline
or ciprofloxacin may be useful in the early
postexposure period.27 Immediately after a
bioterrorist event, 14 days of oral doxycy-
cline or ciprofloxacin should be administered
to exposed persons, as only 10 organisms
are required to produce disease. If the attack
is only recognized after several persons
have become ill, persons who may have
been exposed should not take prophylaxis,
instead, they should be instructed to begin a
“fever watch” (notifying their physician if a
fever develops and seeking prompt treat-
ment). Any unexplained fever or flu-like ill-
ness that occurs within 14 days of exposure
would indicate that treatment should begin.
The existing Tularemia vaccine is a live
organism derived by attenuation (LVS). The
molecular basis of attenuation of the LVS
strain and the degree of attenuation is
unclear. Protective immunity is incomplete.28
Furthermore, quality control type problems
with “scale up” of the existing vaccine may
impede the use of the LVS as a preventive
vaccine in the context of large-scale vacci-
nation campaigns.
SMALLPOX
Smallpox: Pathogen
Smallpox is the most feared and potentially
devastating of all commonly discussed
bioterrorism agents because of the potential
for dissemination from person to person
after a terrorist event, and the lack of antivi-
ral agents for treatment. Smallpox spreads
from person to person via respiratory secre-
tions, direct contact with lesions, and by con-
taminated clothing and linens (infected blan-
kets were once used by British troops to dis-
seminate smallpox among American
Indians). Smallpox is fatal in approximately a
third of previously unvaccinated persons.
Smallpox can be manufactured in large
quantities, can be stored for long periods of
time, and is infectious as when distributed as
an aerosol.  Furthermore, because the WHO
campaign in the 1970’s eradicated circulat-
ing virus, vaccination was discontinued and
therefore, a large percentage of the current
population has no immunity to the virus.  The
stockpile of smallpox vaccine currently avail-
able is controlled by the CDC and is decades
old. It is thought not to be nearly enough to
contain a US outbreak.29
The incubation period for smallpox (variola)
has been estimated to be from nine to 13
days. Onset is marked by the occurrence of
the first lesions - as these are usually flat-
tened, brown, macules and not vesicles, so
the prodromal stage may be missed by inex-
perienced medical personnel. The infected
individual is contagious once these macules
have occurred. Fever develops late in the
prodrome (2nd or 3rd days). The overtly
symptomatic stage, which coincides with the
onset of a vesicular rash predominantly on
the extremities and face and less prominent
on the trunk (that progresses, over weeks, to
eschars), typically occurs 48 to 72 hours
after the onset of fever, and lasts up to 21
days. The infected individual is contagious
during the entire symptomatic period, how-
ever, the prodromal phase (when the patient
is not yet confined to bed by severe illness)
is the period when dissemination is expected
to occur. Quarantine is an extremely effec-
tive measure.
Smallpox: Treatment and Vaccine
One antiviral agent, Cidofovir, has recently
proven useful in the treatment of cowpox
infections in mice. Whether or not it can be
used to treat smallpox in a bioterrorist event
is not clear (and is not approved.)30
Smallpox (variola) immunity is achieved by
vaccination with a live, related virus (vac-
cinia, or cowpox), using methods first
described by Jenner in the  late 1700’s. If
ass vaccination were necessary now, it
would be difficult to screen out individuals at
risk for adverse vaccination effects. Severe,
occasionally fatal, cases of cowpox have
occurred in eczematous and immunosup-
pressed individuals, although cowpox has
not yet been reported in anyone infected
with the human immunodeficiency virus.31
Furthermore, because the smallpox vaccine
is live, the infection can be passed from per-
son to person.  Although this is not a compli-
cation for healthy people, it has the potential
to cause problems for immunocompromised
(i.e. HIV-positive) people, if they were to
come into contact with vaccinated individu-
als. The impact of vaccination of large popu-
lations, especially in cities where HIV infec-
tion is common, is difficult to assess.
Another problem with the smallpox vaccine
is the medium used to propagate the virus.
Smallpox vaccine was made by Wyeth
Laboratories from a strain originally isolated
by the New York City Board of Health. Live
vaccine strain vaccinia (cowpox) was origi-
nally harvested from the lesions on vaccinia-
infected cows. Wyeth discontinued making
the vaccine available for public use in 1983,
however, they recently received several bil-
lion dollars from the department of defense
to re-develop the facilities, infrastructure,
and expertise to produce the smallpox vac-
cine, using cell culture techniques.
Continued use of cows or other live animals
for vaccine production may pose many com-
plications including contamination with bac-
teria, viruses, or prions, and animal proteins
causing adverse reactions in humans.
Regardless of the type of vaccine that is
made, in the U.S. alone at least 40 million
doses of small pox vaccine are needed in
order to stop an outbreak following a bioter-
rorist event.29
CONCLUSION
The four most important lessons learned in
the context of recent bioterrorist events are
that: 1) Delay in intervention can be costly,
leading to an increase in the number of
cases that occur and mortality associated
with those cases; 2) Post-attack intervention
should combine rapid treatment of individu-
als who have the disease, quarantine (if
mallpox), antibiotic prophylaxis (if indicat-
) and vaccination (if available); 3) Proper
planning includes training of medical, public
health and public safety personnel to recog-
nize the infectious agent or event and
respond appropriately; and 4) Stockpiles of
vaccines and antibiotics should be devel-
oped by the authorities. Public health author-
ities and policymakers need to make
detailed response plans available (on the
web and in other public locations). And, as
we learned from our own experience in cor-
rections, a large part of the preparation for
bioterrorist events involves educating med-
ical personnel and staff so that they are
familiar with bioterrorism agents and aware
of the appropriate procedures and protocols
to follow.
*Consultant & Speaker’s Bureau: Abbott,
Agouron Pharmaceuticals, Merck, Roche,
Boehringer-Ingelheim/Roxane Laboratories.
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HEPPigram:
Management of Varicella Zoster Exposure  in a Congregate Living
Environment(Chicken Pox (CP) or Shingles)
A More Common Pox
Evaluate close contacts
Known history of CP or 
known VZV antibody positive (AB + )
Isolate patient until lesions have crusted, treat patient
Immune** Obtain stat VZV serology
Unknown history of CP or 
known VZV antibody negative (AB - )
VZV IgG antibody negative VZV IgG antibody positive
Known case of CP, dermatomal or disseminated Zoster
Susceptible. If infected, will develop rash in 10-21 days
and will be contagious beginning 2 days prior to rash.
Immune**
Single cell or cohort 
susceptible close con-
tacts from 8 days post
exposure until 21 days
past exposure
Put off work from 8 days post exposure until 21 days
post exposure.* If develops CP, return to work when all
lesions are crusted. Recommend follow-up with 
personal physician if immunocompromised or pregnant.
Inmate Staff
Immunocompetent close contact Immunocompromised (HIV, malignancy,
on steroids) or pregnant
Developed by Joseph Bick, M.D.^, Editor, HEPP News. ^Nothing to disclose
VZV=Varicella Zoster Virus       
VZIG=Varicella Zoster Immune Globulin
*Alternatively, assign to work in area where no contact with immunocompromised or pregnant individuals.
**And has been observed in both HIV-positive and HIV-negative patients. These cases are rare and tend
to be mild.
Consider VZIG and varicella vaccination Consider VZIG within 96 hours 
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7Management of HIV-Related Viral Diseases
Common Name
Flu
Chicken Pox
Shingles
CMV
"Mono" and
Oral Hairy
Leukoplakia
Kaposi's 
Sarcoma
G Cold sores 
G Genital
Herpes
Scientific Name
Influenza
Varicella Zoster
(primary)
Varicella Zoster
(dermatomal
zoster)
Cytomegalovirus
Epstein Barr
Virus
KSHV or Human
Herpes Virus-8
(HHV8)
G Herpes
Simplex Virus 1
(HSV1)
G Herpes
Simplex Virus 2
(HSV2)
Virus Family
Orthomyxo-
viridae
Herpesviridae
Herpesviridae
Herpesviridae
Herpesviridae
Herpesviridae
Herpesviridae
Manifestation
Bronchopneumonia,
interstitial infiltrates
Vesicles on erythema-
tous base
Vesicles on erythema-
tous base, usually uni-
lateral, dermatomal 
Opthalmitis,
Pneumonia, Hepatitis,
Gastroenteritis
White plaques with
vertical folds; patches/
confluent on tongue,
usually lateral surface
± dorsum
One or more red or
violaceous macules,
papules or nodules
(usually in cooler loca-
tions of the body) 
Cluster of vesicles on
erythematous base
Treatment
(not yet standard)
Amantadine/ramanta-
dine or neuramidase
inhibitors
Acyclovir 800 mg PO
5x/D x 7-10 D (acy-
clovir resistant:
Foscarnet 40 mg/kg IV
q8h) **
Acyclovir 10 mg/kg IV
q8h x 7 D or 800 mg
PO 5x/D x 7-10 D*
(acyclovir resistant:
Foscarnet 40 mg/kg IV
q8h)**
Ganciclovir 5mg/kg IV
bid x 14-21 days or
foscarnet 60 mg/kg IV
q8h x 14-21 D
Acyclovir 800 mg PO
5x/day x 2-3 weeks,
then 1.2-2g/day;
Tretinoin (Retin A)
0.025% to 0.05% solu-
tion applied 2-3x/day
IF local: topical liquid
nitrogen; intralesional
vinblastine (0.01 mg -
0.02 mg/ lesion) q 2
wks x3; radiation (low
does, eg 400 rads/
week x 6 weeks);
laser†
Acyclovir 200 mg PO
5x/D or 400 mg 3x/D;
p to 800 mg PO 5x/D
or IV acyclovir 5 to 10
mg/kg q8h x 5 to 7 D;
famiciclovir 125 mg PO
bid; valacyclovir 0.5 to
1 g PO bid; or foscar-
net 40 mg/kg IV q8 h
or 60 mg q12h 
Prevention
Preferred: Flu vac-
cine 0.5 mL IM 
yearly (Oct/Nov)
If necessary after
exposure*: VZIG 5
vials (6.25 mL) IM
within 48-96 h of
exposure (AIII)
If necessary after
exposure*: VZIG 5
vials (6.25 mL) IM
within 48-96 h of
exposure (AIII)
Oral ganciclovir 1g
PO tid (CI)
No prevention;
Present in approxi-
mately 20% of
asymptomatic HIV-
positive patients,
common as the dis-
ease progresses
ART often improves
KS lesions in the
absence of specific
therapy
Acyclovir 400 mg PO
bid or famiciclovir
125-250 mg PO bid
or valacyclovir 500
mg PO bid or 1 g/D
†IF Systemic KS: Liposomal daunorubicin (DaunoXome) 40-60 mg/m2 IV q 2 weeks or liposomal doxorubicin (Doxil) x 10-20 mg/m2; Taxol 100-135
mg/m2 q 2-3 weeks; adriamycin, bleomycin, and either vincristine or vinblastine (ABV); vincristine/vinblastine; bleomycin/vinca alkaloids; alpha interfer-
on (18-36 million IU/D) IM or SC x 10-12 weeks then 18 M.U./D-36 M.U. 3X/ week = million units 
*Indications for VZIG = exposure to varicella zoster in: a non-immune immuniocompromised individual, an immunocompromised person whose varicel-
la status is unknown; and a non-immune pregnant woman 
** Famciclovir or valacyclovir are frequently preferred for oral therapy of shingles due to easier adherence, better efficacy, or improved drug levels.
Strength of Recommendation Ratings:A: Should always be offered; B: Should generally be offered; C: Optional; D: Should generally NOT be offered;
E: Should NEVER be offered
Quality of Evidence:I  Evidence from at least one  properly randomized, controlled trial;  II: Evidence from at least one well-designed clinical trial with-
out randomization, from cohort or case-controlled analytic studies (preferably from more than once center), or from multiple time-series studies. Or dra-
matic results from uncontrolled experiments;  III: Evidence from opinions of respected authorities based on clinical experience, descriptive studies, or
reports of expert committees.
References:
Bartlett JG and Gallant JE.  2001-2002 Medical Management of HIV Infection.  Johns Hopkins University, MD. 2001.
Merigan TC, Bartlett JG, Bolognesi D, eds. Textbook of AIDS Medicine. Williams and Wilkins.  Baltimore, MD. 1999.
February 2002     Volume 5, Issue 2 visit HEPP News online at www.hivcorrections.org
2002 National STD Prevention
Conference
March 4-7, 2002
San Diego, California
Fee: after Feb. 8: $165
Visit: http://www.stdconference.org/
Call: Glenda Vaughn,
404.639.8260
Email: ghv1@cdc.gov
Management of HIV/AIDS in the
Correctional Setting: A Live
Satellite Videoconference Series
"Dermatological Manifestations
of HIV Infection"
March 12, 2002
12:30-3:30 p.m. EST
Call: 518-262-4674
Email: ybarraj@mail.amc.edu
Visit: www.amc.edu/patient/HIV/
hivconf.htm
CME credit Available
American Correctional Health
Services Association Annual
Conference
March 14-17, 2002
Portland,Oregon
“Corrections in the 
Continuum of Care”
Fee: members $245; 
nonmembers $295
Email: achsa@mindspring.com
Call: 636.561.8857
Fax: 636.625.6356
Visit: http://www.corrections.com/
achsa/
14th National HIV/AIDS Update
Conference (NAUC)
March 19-22, 2002
San Francisco, California
Sponsored by amfAr
Fee: Dec 15-March 1: $325; 
After March 1: $375 
(special rates available)
Visit: http://www.amfar.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/nauc/index.html
CME credit available
International Conference on
Emerging Infectious Diseases
(ICEID)
March 24-27, 2002
Atlanta, Georgia
Fee: before March 4: $300; 
on-site: $350
Visit: http://www.cdc.gov/iceid/
Call: Charles Schable,
404.639.4581
Email: cas1@cdc.gov
Save the 
Dates
8
HIV
Half of HIV-positive Patients Harbor 
Drug-Resistant Virus
Washington Post, 12/19/01
A report at the annual American Society of
Microbiologists (ASM) meeting revealed that
approximately half of HIV-positive patients are
infected with virus resistant to at least one anti-
retroviral drug. The study surveyed patients in
cities and rural areas across the US, in small
clinics and large hospitals in 1999. The study
found 37% of patients with no detectable virus,
while of the remaining 63% of patients with
detectable virus, 78% had drug-resistant virus.
Overall, 49% of HIV-positive patients are infect-
ed with drug-resistant virus.  A similar study pre-
sented at ICAAC linked the lowest CD4+ cell
count in the patient's history to the likelihood of
developing drug resistance. Ninety percent of
patients whose lowest CD4+ cell count was <50
had developed drug resistance compared with
80% of patients whose lowest CD4+ count was
between 50 and 200, 50% of patients whose
CD4+ count never dropped below 500. Experts
interpret this as support for starting treatment
early.
STI Looks Promising for Some Patients
A new review of information on Structured
Treatment Interruption (STI) has revealed that
HAART treatment that incorporates STI may be
beneficial for patients who are newly infected
with HIV. Studies of small patient cohorts have
found that newly infected patients who are put on
a HAART regimen that includes STI are able to
maintain long-term control of viral replication.
The optimal length of the on-drug/off-drug cycle
has not yet been determined and it is not known
if STI could provide any benefit to chronically-
infected HIV patients with significant immune
system damage (Lori, JAMA 2001; 286:2981-
2987). To help answer some of these questions,
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) is organizing a larger study on
the outcomes of patients placed on a Structured
Treatment Interruption (STI) regimen. Half of the
participants will be put on continuous HAART
therapy while the other half will be put on a
HAART regimen including STI. Possible STI
benefits include fewer side effects from drug tox-
icity for the patient and a cost reduction for
Medicaid and insurance companies (Rocky
Mountain News, 1/10/02; Denver Post, 1/10/02).
For more on STI, see HEPP News, Oct. 2001.
HIV-Positive Californians Guaranteed Access
to HIV Specialists
BW HealthWire, 1/6/02
California currently has a law that requires man-
aged care companies to provide HIV-positive
patients with HIV medical specialists. Beginning
July 1, 2002, those who wish to be recognized as
HIV specialists must be certified by the American
Academy of HIV Medicine (AAHIVM), or meet
the specific accreditation criteria. For information
on free accreditation, visit www.aahivm.org or
call 866-241-9601.
Hepatitis
Demand Exceeds Supply: PEG-Intron
Wall Street Journal, 1/16/02
Schering-Plough announced that demand for the
new HCV drug PEG-Intron (pegylated interferon)
(see Newsflashes, HEPP News October 2001)
currently exceeds supply. To address this,
Schering has developed a procedure for all
patients who wish to begin drug treatment.  Most
new patients may wait 10-12 weeks before
beginning their PEG-Intron treatment.  However,
all 60,000 patients who are already being treated
with the medication should not experience any
problems with the supply. There is supply set-
aside for "urgent" requests for PEG-Intron, which
will be reviewed by a medical committee. For
more information, call 908.298.2202.
Hepatitis C Protease Inhibitor
New York Times, 1/7/02
Like HIV, Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) needs its pro-
tease enzyme for replication. Eli Lilly and Co.
and Vertex Pharmaceuticals have been working
on a new anti-HCV drug, a protease inhibitor that
blocks the function of the protease enzyme.
This new drug can be taken orally and is expect-
ed to enter human trials in 2003. 
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Resources & Websites
CDC Public Health Emergency Preparedness
and Response information on various
biopathogens is available from the CDC at: 
www.bt.cdc.gov/
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/indexbt.html
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5041.pdf
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5042.pdf
www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/Smallpox.asp
www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Anthrax/Anthrax.asp
www.bt.cdc.gov./Agent/Tularemia/Tularemia.asp
www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Botulism/Botulism.asp
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm5041a2.htm
Educational Video on Bioterrorism in the Mail
available for people who sort, process and deliver
mail. Order from the Pubic Health Foundation 
(PHF): call 877.252.1200; fax 301.843.0159; or
visit http://bookstore.phf.org
Anthrax Information
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/
HIV Treatment Resources
NEW Adult and Adolescent HIV Treatment
guidelines
http://www.hivatis.org/guidelines/adult/
Feb04_02/AdultGdl.pdf
NEW HHS Guidelines for the use of 
Antiretrovirals in Pregnant Women
http://www.hivatis.org/guidelines/perinatal/
Feb4_02/Perin.pdf
Self-Assessment Test for Continuing Medical Education Credit
Brown Medical School designates this educational activity for 1 hour in category 1 credit toward the AMA Physician’s Recognition Award.
To be eligible for CME credit, answer the questions below by circling the letter next to the correct answer to each of the questions. 
A minimum of 70% of the questions must be answered correctly. This activity is eligible for CME credit through August 31, 2002. 
The estimated time for completion of this activity is one hour and there is no fee for participation.
1. Which of the following is the correct treatment for dermatomal
zoster (shingles)?
a) Acyclovir 10 mg/kg IV q8h x 7 D or 800 mg PO 5x/D x 7-10 D
b) Oral ganciclovir 1g PO tid
c) Ganciclovir 5mg/kg IV bid x 14-21 days
d) Acyclovir 800 mg PO 5x/day x 2-3 weeks, then 1.2-2g/day; 
Tretinoin (Retin A) 0.025% to 0.05% solution applied 2-3x/day
e) Ganciclovir 10 mg/kg IV q 8h x 7D or 800 mg 
PO 5x/D x 7-10 D
2. How many days prior to developing a VZV rash is the infected
individual considered contagious?
a) 24 hours
b) 2 days
c) 8 days
d) 10 days
e) 21 days
3. True or False: If a letter is suspected to be contaminated with
anthrax, all persons who have handled the letter and/or envelope
should wash their hands with soap and water.
a) True
b) False
4. What is the preferred treatment for a case of inhalation anthrax
(initial regimen)?
a) oral ciproflaxin 500 mg po BID
b) ciproflaxin 400 mg every 12 h IV
c) streptomycin 15020 mg/kg/day IM in divided doses
d) doxycycline 100 mg every 12 h IV and one or two additional 
antimicrobials
e) b or d
5.  Which antibiotics were recommended in the most recent
anthrax cases? 
a) Doxycycline + ciproflaxin
b) penicillin VK + amoxicillin
c) piperacillin + gentamicin
d) a and b
e) a, b, and c
6. Which of the following antimicrobials is effective against
plague?
a) streptomycin
b) doxycycline
c) gentamicin
d) ciproflaxin or ofloxacin
e) all of the above
BROWN MEDICAL SCHOOL •  OFFICE OF CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION •  BOX G-A2  •  PROVIDENCE, RI 02912
The Brown Medical School is accredited by the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME)to provide continuing medical 
education activities for physicians.  
The use of the Brown Medical School name implies review of the educational format and material only.  The opinions, recommendations 
and editorial positions expressed by those whose input is included in this bulletin are their own.  They do not represent or speak for the 
Brown Medical School.
For Continuing Medical Education credit please complete the following and mail or fax to 401.863.2660 or 
register online at www.hivcorrections.org. Be sure to print clearly so that we have the correct information for you.
Name __________________________________________________________________ Degree ____________________
Address ____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
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HEPP News Evaluation
5 Excellent    4 Very Good    3 Fair    2 Poor    1 Very Poor
1. Please evaluate the following sections with respect to:
educational value clarity
Main Article 5  4  3  2  1   5  4  3  2  1     
HEPPigram 5  4  3  2  1   5  4  3  2  1  
HIV 101 5  4  3  2  1   5  4  3  2  1
Save the
Dates 5  4  3  2  1   5  4  3  2  1
2. Do you feel that HEPP News helps you in your work?
Why or why not?
3. What future topics should HEPP News address?
4. How can HEPPNews be made more useful to you?
5. Do you have specific comments on this issue?
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